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FROM BALANCE TO CONFLICT: A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR THE EU 
Mark Dawson & Floris de Witte
∗
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
For the first time since the start of the Euro-zone crisis; proposals, visions and agendas are being 
discussed about how to redesign the integration project in order to structurally overcome the 
weaknesses that the crisis has exposed. One thing appears clear: the European Union post-crisis will be a 
very different animal from the pre-crisis EU. In previous articles, we have analyzed how the 
management of the crisis has undermined (or at least exposed the existing problems with) the 
substantive, institutional and spatial balance that was laid down in the Treaties. In doing so, we argued 
that the Union risks destabilizing its commitment to the values of individual and collective self-
determination, which are indispensable for its legitimacy.
1
 We have also argued that the different 
proposals for the future of Europe that are currently being discussed all fail to incorporate these values 
or articulate them in a way that strengthens, rather than weakens, the EU’s legitimacy and stability.
2
 
What these proposals have in common is their presumption that significant changes to the Union’s set-
up are necessary in order for the Union to meet its objectives. 
This article offers an alternative model for the EU’s constitutional future. Its objective is to invert the 
Union’s current path-dependency: changes to the way in which the Union works should serve to 
question, rather than entrench, its future objectives and trajectory. Our conceptual starting point is (as 
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As the crisis (and the Union’s response to it) further develops, one thing appears clear: the European 
Union post-crisis will be a very different animal from the pre-crisis EU. This article offers an alternative 
model for the EU’s constitutional future. Its objective is to invert the Union’s current path-dependency: 
changes to the way in which the Union works should serve to question, rather than entrench, its future 
objectives and trajectory. The paper argues that the post-crisis EU requires a quite different normative, 
institutional and juridical framework. Such a framework must focus on reproducing the social and 
political cleavages that underlie the idea of authority on the national level, and that allow divisive 
political choices to be legitimised. This reform project implies reshaping the prerogatives of the 
European institutions. Rather than seeking to prevent or bracket political conflict, the division of 
institutional competences and tasks should be rethought in order to allow the EU institutions to 
internalize within their decision-making process the conflicts reproduced by social and political 
cleavages. Finally, a reformed legal order must play an active role as a facilitator and container of 
conflict over the ends of the integration project. 
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in our previous articles) a commitment to self-determination. Self-determination offers a richer 
framework than the concept of democracy (often used in the context of the EU), as it is able to 
articulate the importance of the citizens’ actual capacity to affect the economic, social, and moral 
texture of society (rather than limiting its demands to those of formal voice in the decision-making 
process). As will be discussed below, this distinction has important consequences for the way in which 
we should think about the Union’s future. Ironically, in fact, it is often domestic commitments to formal 
democracy that stand in the way of a meaningful European project of self-determination.  
After briefly outlining how the Union’s response to the Euro-crisis has undermined the concept of 
constitutional balance – the EU’s pre-crisis structure of self-determination (section 1) - the paper will 
argue that the post-crisis EU requires a quite different constitutional framework. Such a framework 
must focus on reproducing the social and political cleavages that underlie the idea of substantive 
balance on the national level, and that allow divisive political choices to be legitimised (section 2). This 
reform project implies reshaping the prerogatives of the European institutions. Rather than seeking to 
prevent or bracket political conflict, the division of institutional competences and tasks should be 
rethought in order to allow the EU institutions to internalize within their decision-making process the 
conflicts reproduced by social and political cleavages (section 3). This, primarily, requires a shift in power 
from executive and technocratic institutions towards representative bodies. This normative and 
institutional re-alignment also requires a rethinking of the question of political equality that underlies 
spatial balance in the EU. Rather than balancing the equality of states and citizens within existing 
institutions, it is argued that we should move towards two separate institutions – one 
intergovernmental and one supranational – that respect and reflect the full equality of their 
constituents. The recent trend, we argue, that understands national parliaments as the bulwark of 
democratic authority in the EU threatens, rather than protects, the concept of self-determination in 
Europe (section 4). Finally, in establishing and securing these values, we see an important role for law. A 
reformed legal order would play an active role as a facilitator and container for political deliberation 
over the ends of the integration project. It would in this sense leave important substantive questions to 
the political sphere instead of trying to steer policy choices within formal legal discourse (section 5).  
This reconstitution of the EU’s normative, institutional and legal dimensions are necessary for it to 
further the project of self-determination. Rather than entrenching certain conceptions of ‘the good life’, 
or a particular balance between politics and the market; the EU must serve – as any political project 
ultimately must – to question these conceptions. Without such drastic changes, the integration project is 
likely to continue to generate the despondency and lethargy that are as much a cause as a symptom of 
its legitimacy crisis.     
 
1. CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE AND ITS DISINTEGRATION DURING THE EURO-CRISIS 
In a previous article, we argued that the stability and legitimacy of the Union has been undermined by 
the Member States’ responses in containing the Euro-crisis.
3
 We argued, in general terms, that any 
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 3
defensible form of European integration must be able to forward the project of individual and collective 
self-determination. This centrality of self-determination forms the normative core of the idea of 
constitutional balance, which was further substantiated, within the Treaties, in three different domains. 
First, it found expression in the substantive balance between what the EU can do and what Member 
States should do – seeking to insulate the capacity of Member States and their citizens to decide on 
salient policy questions such as redistributive policies. Second, it was expressed in institutional terms by 
linking the voices of different interests as represented by different European institutions – in order to 
ensure that the diverse views of citizens find expression in the decision making process. Finally, the idea 
of balance was expressed in spatial terms by ensuring equality between Member States regardless of 
size, in order to protect the spaces for self-determination and political contestation as they exist on the 
national level. Overall, we argued these three dimensions of the constitutional balance upon which the 
EU was premised were fundamental to its functioning in so far as it allowed citizens to control the norms 
that guide their societies. Constitutional balance thereby attempted to ensure that the norms decided 
by the EU strengthened, rather than challenged, the citizens’ capacity for self-determination. This 
commitment to constitutional balance, we concluded, was what stabilized and legitimized the Union.   
As many scholars have argued, this commitment was challenged in different ways in the decades leading 
up the Euro-crisis. Scharpf, Menéndez and Streeck have all highlighted how judicial decisions, 
institutional constraints, macro-economic processes and political compromises have, in different ways, 
challenged the diverse ideas of balance that could be read into the Treaties.
4
 Our contention is that this 
process of erosion of the Union’s commitment to self-determination has sped up and become both 
more pronounced and more problematic in the aftermath of the crisis. On the one hand, the Euro-crisis 
has made explicit and visible the many fault-lines in the structure of the integration process that were 
already present.
5
 The tension implicit in the choice to create a single monetary policy with the retention 
of national competences in the area of economic and fiscal policy is perhaps the most obvious. On the 
other hand, the erosion of the Union’s commitment to self-determination has become more 
problematic since the euro-crisis began, in the sense that the Union is now openly and often bluntly 
engaging in redistributive politics. Such politics presuppose a much thicker commitment to self-
determination than the Union’s institutional set-up can currently garner.  
The Union’s response to the Euro-crisis, we argued, has undermined all three dimensions of the concept 
of constitutional balance. The crisis’ undermining of the idea of substantive balance is closely connected 
to the EU’s increasing in-roads in Member State autonomy in redistributive, fiscal and budgetary 
matters. This is most dramatically visible, of course, in the conditionality criteria that debtor states must 
accept in return for financial support, which explicitly demand labour market reforms, liberalization of 
public services, cuts to old-age pensions and the privatization of public property.
6
 Even in solvent 
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Member States, the excessive deficit procedure, the macro-economic imbalance procedure and the 
country-specific recommendations within the context of the European Semester have increasingly 
limited national autonomy over redistributive, fiscal and budgetary matters. It was our contention that 
such limits pose a problem for the stability of a Union that does not possess the institutional and socio-
cultural resources that enable it to legitimately make such salient and divisive political choices.
7
   
The response to the crisis equally undermined the concept of institutional balance. The relationship 
between the Union institutions is a delicate and sophisticated one, which functions to ensure that 
different and diffuse interests can voice their concerns within the decision-making process. As such, this 
wide and varied access through different institutions ensured that the Union, despite the lack of strong 
democratic credentials, remained responsive to the desires of Member States and citizens. Since the 
start of the euro-crisis, we have seen a drastic change in the EU institutional structure towards executive 
dominance. Agenda-setting has shifted from the Commission to the European Council – with the 
Commission increasingly playing an enforcement role in monitoring compliance with its political choices, 
while the European Parliament (and national parliaments) have been all but sidelined from the new 
structures for economic and monetary governance. These changes, we argued, further decrease the 
stability and legitimacy of the Union by removing choices over binding norms away from representative 
institutions, which serve to mediate between different conceptions of the ‘good’ in society and as such, 
help to legitimize the policy choices they make.
8
  
Finally, the response to the crisis also challenged the idea of spatial balance, which sees to the equality 
between Member States, and which in turn seeks to protect spaces for self-determination and political 
contestation on the national level. Since the inception of the crisis, many of the instruments that sought 
to preserve this spatial balance have been undercut. Two of the most notable examples are the 
requirement that all Member States agree to Treaty amendments, which has been bypassed by way of 
the use of international law for the ESM and Fiscal Compact; and voting rights in the ESM, which reflects 
the Member States’ respective financial contributions rather than their status as equal and sovereign 
political spaces.  
Overall, we argued, these shifts significantly undermine the capacity of the EU to produce stable and 
legitimate norms – pushing it in ‘executive federal’ or ‘authoritarian liberal’ directions.9 It might be 
objected that such rebalancing of the EU was inevitable (‘alternativlos’, as the German Chancellor once 
put it). After all, the Union has now certainly moved from being a regulatory polity (if it ever really was) 
to being a (re)distributive one: it creates clear winners and losers. This shift certainly entails that new 
competences be transferred from the national to the Union level, that the institutional settlement be re-
aligned, and that the division of decision-making power between states and citizens needs to be 
rethought. Our contention is not that such rebalancing is problematic per se, but rather that the way in 
which it has happened has further limited, rather than promoted, the idea of the Union as a project of 
self-determination.  
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The difficulties of such re-balancing is evident when considering the first range of proposals concerning 
the future direction of the EU post-crisis. These proposals are diverse – ranging from commitments to 
further entrench ‘executive federalism’ to advocates of significant differentiated integration within the 
EU. While we have discussed the benefits – and limitations – of these approaches in a further article, 
their common premise is their concern with deepening and legitimising the EU project, but without 
contesting the substantive goals the EU seeks to pursue and their embedding in the EU’s legal order.
10
 In 
this sense, the reform proposals advanced to date are not designed to create a European structure that 
is capable of answering the basic question that underlies any polity: ‘what type of society do we want to 
live in?’ Instead, they largely attempt to sideline this question by constitutionalizing and embedding 
current policy preferences. 
A more fruitful approach may be to consider how we can reform the EU in a way that allows it to 
problematize its increase in coercive force, while respecting the structural principles of self-
determination that are vital for its stability and legitimacy. How can we conceptualise self-determination 
in the Union, and how can we remedy the evident social and political limits to the Union’s current 
trajectory? Or, in even simpler terms: how can we ensure that - if we are to have austerity under 
conditions of a deepened Economic and Monetary Union - it is at least Europe’s citizens’ choice?  
Only by creating a framework in Europe that offers its citizens a chance to answer these questions 
directly on the European level can we both move beyond the limitations to the scope of the integration 
process that the ‘old’ constitutional balance in Europe produced and build a constitutional order for 
Europe that takes the promise of self-determination seriously. In order to do so, however, it is argued 
that we need a drastic re-formulation of our current institutional, normative and legal understanding of 
the EU. More specifically, we will argue that we need to (a) recreate on the European level the social 
cleavages that underlie the idea of substantive balance on the national level; (b) alter the role and 
prerogatives of the European institutions, in a way that manages to internalize the conflict produces by 
social cleavages within European decision-making; and (c) openly face the question of political equality 
that underlies spatial balance. Only such a structure may be capable of allowing citizens to retain the 
capacity to answer the most basic political question: ‘in what type of society do we want to live?’  
 
 
2. FROM SUBSTANTIVE BALANCE TO SUBSTANTIVE CONFLICT 
 
The idea of substantive balance speaks to the need for the balance of powers between the EU and its 
Member States to be struck in such a way that the citizen retains the capacity to realize himself both as 
an individual and, together with fellow citizens, collectively as a political community.
11
 To put it in simple 
terms: the social, economic and moral fabric of society must be traceable back to the desires, wishes 
and preferences of the electorate.  
                                                          
10
 See in depth, Mark Dawson and Floris de Witte, “Self-Determination in the Constitutional Future of the EU” 
(2015) 21 ELJ (forthcoming). 
11
 A. Somek, “Epilogue: What is at Stake?” in E. Chiti, A. Menendez and P. Teixeira (Eds.) The European Rescue of 
the European Unio’ (Oslo, ARENA, 2012), 503. 
 6
 
Until recently, this entailed that Member States retained autonomy over the most salient policy areas, 
such as fiscal and redistributive policies, and that the decision-making process in the EU was consensual, 
and not majoritarian.12 Increasingly, however, the EU (whether out of economic necessity or political 
expediency) is describing how we are to live together, and what ‘common good’ we are to strive for.
13
 
Such redistributive and allocative decisions invariably have very clearly identifiable winners and losers, 
and challenge the paradigm of the EU as a polity based on consensual decision-making.
14
 Redistributive 
discussions, in the current EU, cannot be made in the context of a conflict of interests between (say) 
banks and pensioners. The ‘logic of the system’ articulates redistribution as being a conflict of interest 
between states (say, Germany versus Greece).
15
 Such ‘national’ cleavages are deeply problematic, not 
only for the Union’s legitimacy, but also for its capacity to be a project of self-determination.  
 
Indeed, for the Union’s engagement with redistributive questions to reflect a commitment to self-
determination we need a radical overhaul of the Union’s decision-making process. Rather than 
bracketing social and political conflict (as the Union has done so far),
16
 and channeling it to the narrative 
that pits Member States against each other, the EU will need to foster and channel new forms of social 
and political conflict, so as to allow for common control of citizens over the conditions of life, and so as 
to mediate between different conceptions of the ‘common good’. Current domestic and supranational 
electoral methods do not suffice. Such conflicts, after all, are indispensable not only in finding the 
appropriate answer to political questions, but also in legitimizing and enforcing the answer. Scholars 
have long analysed the positive properties of social conflict as a precondition for democracy and for the 
emergence of political solidarity.
17
 Dani has highlighted that social conflicts can enhance the dynamism 
of a polity by injecting an element of passion and aspiration; they can enhance citizen participation in, 
and identification with the polity by fostering a sense of solidarity and community among individuals 
that share a common conception of the ‘good’; and they enhance the stability of the polity by 
internalizing and proceduralising aggression and disagreement,
18
 as well as producing sites for the 
recognition of diversity.
19
 Chalmers adds a fourth element, which goes to legitimizing policy choices, 
given that “conflicts make politics bearable for the disempowered as they enable interests to organize 
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and seek change whilst still claiming allegiance to the political settlement.” In other words, “the 
presence of conflicts simultaneously articulates the presence of dominance and problematizes it”, 
opening the way for future political change.
20
 The existence of clearly defined conflicts, engendered by 
different conceptions of the ‘good’, finally, also enhances the citizens’ capacity for self-determination: 
they help the individual to order and understand political questions within the polity, forcing them to 
better understand themselves, articulate their obligations towards fellow citizens, and engage in the 
overall normative project of the polity.
21
 Or, to put it from the perspective of the development of the 
polity: the internalization of social conflicts help to ensure that citizens productively engage in the 
construction of society. 
 
If the EU wants to offer its citizens a space through which to realize themselves, understand themselves 
as part of a common political project, and participate in the creation of binding rules, it will not only 
require institutional reforms (on which more below).
22
 As Bartolini has forcefully argued, the structuring 
of a polity that is strong enough to engender, sustain and channel political conflict requires much more 
sophistication that the Union currently possesses.
23
 Open social and political conflict without the 
support of processes of centre formation, system building and political structuring will not lead to the 
strengthening of the EU, but to political rupture.
24
 If anything, this is precisely the reason why the Union 
has historically been careful in avoiding the institutionalization of open political and social conflict, and 
has instead opted for a consensual model of decision-making.
25
  
 
For conflict about the direction of the EU to be a positive rather than a disintegrative force, three 
prerequisites are required. First, we must move beyond understanding conflicts in the EU as being, again 
in blunt terms, about German interests versus Greek interests. Not only is nothing gained by articulating 
conflict in the EU as such, but it also obscures the much wider and pervasive functional cleavages and 
conflicts that undergird the Union’s future trajectory. The stickiness of the ‘national cleavage’ is, 
ironically enough, often presented and defended as the result of a commitment to democracy. Scharpf’s 
assessment of the evolution of European democracy in the aftermath of the crisis, for example, argues 
that it is (and must be) an inevitable result of the consensual nature of decision-making in the EU.
26
 The 
logic, here, presumes that the German positon in support of austerity and the Greek position rejecting 
austerity are both domestically democratically legitimated. In consequence, the Union becomes a forum 
for the mediation between these two diverging national positions, rather than a forum through which 
the functional tensions between, say, public sector workers and bankers in the EU are mediated.  
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While we agree with many elements of Scharpf’s analysis, his  understanding of the interaction between 
national democratic forces and the politicization of the EU is problematic, it is argued, in two ways. First, 
it is based on a very formalistic understanding of democracy, which would suggest that the German 
position and the Greek position – even if they are diametrically opposed – are both democratically 
legitimate. Such a formalistic understanding is unsatisfactory because it does not conceptually account 
for the capacity of the Greek and German electorate to actually affect the social, economic and moral 
conditions of their life. To put it as simply as possible, the outcome of the mediation process in the EU 
cannot both favour and reject austerity. While the electorate is offered a formal chance to voice their 
preferences domestically, such a voice is only marginally connected (for most Member States’ 
electorate) to their capacity to actually affect the social, economic and moral conditions of life, which 
are dictated by the other factors: relative economic strength, technocratic predictions, legal limitations 
and the preferences of supranational actors. Understanding the EU from the perspective of self-
determination, instead, suggests that what is central is not the electorate’s capacity for voice, but the 
capacity to affect one’s conditions of life. As long as we remain captured by the ‘nationalist’ cleavage, 
and understand those preferences as being the result of a democratic process, we cannot guarantee 
that the citizens’ needs, desires and preferences are central to the conditions of social, economic and 
moral life in the EU. The second problem with the predominance of the ‘national’ cleavage is that they 
are self-reinforcing. They encourage citizens to think and identify in terms of positions that do not match 
their preferences, needs and desires as individuals. An end to austerity might well in in the interests of 
public sector workers and manual labour workers in both Greece and Germany, but the national 
cleavage shields their common affinities. In other words, the dominance of the national cleavage both 
promotes an idea of democracy that has little to do with self-determination and prevents the 
emergence of cleavages that can articulate the individual’s preferences, needs and desires on the 
European level.  
 
It is argued that we should recreate ‘functional’ cleavages in the transnational arena, including 
transnational political parties that produce and channel political voice,
27
 and thereby stabilize and 
legitimize authority can help the Union to overcome this impasse.
28
 This requires sophisticated 
structures that manage to structure, channel, collect and voice different preferences, needs and desires 
that different groups in society have. Traditionally, this role is played by political parties, civil society, 
media, grassroots movements (at times pursuing a single goal), trade unions, and NGOs, which serve to 
organize, group, and articulate the conflicting political claims in society. The traditional political 
cleavages, as identified by Lipset and Rokkan, can be traced in the EU.
29
 It is not difficult to point to new 
challenges thrown up by the integration process to the centre-periphery, urban-rural, capital-labour, or 
church-state cleavages.
30
 Certain cleavages have even been created, skewed, or their saliency 
exacerbated by the Union – one can think of generational conflict in the aftermath of the crisis, the 
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balance between the genders, the conflict between creditor and debtor states, or the conflict, 
increasingly visible in national welfare regulation, between mobile and immobile citizens.
31
 Some of 
these cleavages are starting to produce structural platforms for their articulation on the transnational or 
European level32 – but for such cleavages to displace the ‘nationalistic’ cleavage, the EU needs to do 
much more to encourage this process.
33
 This is not easy: cleavage construction requires mobilization –  
which may be even more difficult in a transnational setting, where linguistic, cultural or historical cues 
might make such mobilization less straightforward. At the same time, as Tilly convincingly argues, , the 
reconstruction of trust networks, and their incorporation within party politics, is absolutely essential for 
the democratization of a polity.
34
 The disintegration of national cleavages and political allegiance and 
their reconstitution on the transnational level is thus crucial to ensure that political conflicts are played 
out within the Union’s political system, and serve to build the trust and loyalty that stabilize political 
projects, rather than fostering resistance against the Union.
35
 As will be discussed below, this requires a 
serious overhaul of the EU’s institutional structure.  
 
The second element that is required before social and political conflict can be a productive force in the 
EU is the opening up of the policy objectives of the integration process. The main element in 
strengthening the emergence of cleavages in the European political settlement lies in the capacity of the 
new transnational actors to actually change the course of integration.36 The different choices about the 
type of integration that we may prefer must be meaningful, and must relate to different understandings 
of basic premises of shared life.
37
 Without this, political and social mobilization will remain a pipe dream: 
whichever sophisticated institutional model of democracy is adopted will fail without the possibility to 
change the social and economic structure of society.
38
 As Scharpf has put it, “politicization without the 
possibility of autonomous policy choices is more likely to produce frustration, alienation, apathy or 
rebellion, rather than democratic legitimacy”.
39
 Overcoming this impasse entails some institutional 
change, as discussed below, but also, importantly, it requires loosening up the Treaty objectives to 
encourage contestation about the Union’s objectives and direction.
40
 The Treaty prevents such 
contestation in different ways. As Garben and Davies have recently noted, the purposive (or functional) 
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nature of the Union’s competences mitigate against the existence of an open process of contestation 
about the policy orientation of EU norms.
41
 In addition, in many domains, at the moment, the policy 
preferences of the Union are constitutionally entrenched.
42
 This, again, is a reflection of the 
understanding of the integration process as mediating conflicts between Member States, rather than 
conflicts between its citizens. Examples abound: monetary policy is geared towards ‘price stability’ 
instead of ‘full employment’,
43
 energy policy focuses on competitiveness and energy security instead of 
democratic access
44
, non-discrimination policy fosters labour market access over dignity in the 
workplace,
45
 the Court’s interpretation of Article 125 TFEU entails that financial assistance must be 
based on conditionality instead of solidarity,
46
 the excessive deficit procedure prefers austerity over 
Keynesian solutions, and the free movement provisions themselves already express a very particular 
understanding of the interaction between state and market.47 Even in the absence of legislative 
intervention, these policy preferences find expression in case-law. The Court has been well-known for its 
willingness to read such objectives into primary and secondary EU law.
48
 This is not to say that in each of 
these policy areas the alternatives might be more attractive or feasible, but simply to say that for the EU 
to be able to legitimize such choices as an act of self-determining citizens, it needs to allow for their 
social and political contestation.   
 
The third and final precondition for the emergence of ‘functional’ rather than ‘national’ cleavages is a 
placation of territorial and cultural cleavages in the EU. Many scholars have warned that opening up the 
EU to the full force of social and political conflict risks “creating disruptive political conflicts and radical 
anti-European opposition” that could well signal the end of the integration process.
49
 The logic here – 
eloquently articulated by Bartolini – is that democratization leads to political rupture if the territorial 
and cultural questions are not settled.
50
 This means, in simple terms, that if we open up the EU to social 
and political conflict, the only conflict that will emerge is whether a particular group, region, state, 
linguistic, cultural or ethic space should be part of the EU. Every policy initiative would not be discussed 
on its merits (and as such represent the traditional ‘functional’ cleavages), but only in territorial or 
cultural terms. The risk, in such a scenario, is not only that this brings us even further from the idea(l) of 
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self-determination, but also that it recasts the ‘national’ cleavages in an even more explosive format.  In 
order to prevent such territorial and identity politics from emerging, and protect and stimulate the role 
of the EU as the forum through which socio-economic choices pertaining to the way in which European 
citizens want to live their lives are articulated, we need to insulate the Union’s political process from 
such challenges. Two ideas present themselves. First, a new Treaty could bracket a number of salient 
policy choices in the cultural domain (such as rules protecting languages) and in the moral domain (such 
as rules pertaining to drugs or euthanasia. Such choices, the new Treaty could argue, are not to be 
harmonized, leaving it open to cities, regions, or states to regulate such matters. Alternatively, a new 
Treaty could entrench a commitment to cultural diversity. Second, territorial tensions could be placated 
(at least in the short-term)
51
 by referendums in all Member States before the new Treaty structure, 
detailed below, is adopted. Such a referendum, to be held on the same day across the EU, would offer a 
clear question (in or out?), a clear reversion point,
52
 and would reconstitute a ‘coalition of the willing’ 
while addressing the territorial question.
53
  
 
The idea that substantive questions pertaining to what constitutes a ‘good life’ should be decided by 
individual citizens - insulating such questions on the national level where sophisticated political 
structures, shielded from the intrusion of EU law, guarantee that such choices reflect the desires of 
citizens – no longer holds. The EU makes increasingly divisive and invasive political choices in the 
aftermath of the crisis, but does not dispose of the traditional political and institutional mechanisms 
that can link such choices to the preferences of citizens. In fact, while contestation of the EU’s current 
austerity drive has been omnipresent in Europe for the last five years, it is only slowly emerging within 
the EU’s decision-making process itself. This creates a serious problem not only for the legitimacy of the 
Union’s policies, creating alienated and disaffected citizens, but also for the Union itself. As acutely 
observed by Mair, without the possibility for contestation within the EU, dissatisfaction quickly 
translates into contestation of the EU.54 A more stable alternative may be a move towards a culture of 
political and social conflict that can serve to challenge, mediate, prioritise, and, ultimately, legitimize 
what constitutes the ‘good life’ in the EU.   
 
3. THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF CONFLICT  
 
A renewed emphasis on political and social conflict also requires, of course, a different institutional set-
up; one able to ‘translate’ conflict into political action. Traditionally, the institutional set-up of the EU 
sought to secure institutional balance, which sees to the incorporation of diverse interests within the 
decision-making process. In particular in a multi-level polity such as the EU, it was considered important 
that different forums and institutional structures exist that manage to incorporate citizens’ viewpoints 
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through diverse channels, and offer multiple spaces for participation. The Union’s current institutional 
balance is justified by its capacity to prevent conflict and foster consensual decision-making by creating a 
super-majority, to be agreed on by three different institutions (each with a different majority), for the 
adoption of policies.55 It is clear, however, that the Union’s increasing engagement with salient and 
redistributive issues, and suggested focus on the generation and incorporation of social and political 
conflict within the EU, requires a radical reconfiguration of the EU’s institutional structure. At the 
moment, as Sarah Hobolt has demonstrated, “while citizens increasingly hold the EU responsible for 
economic outcomes, they cannot hold European politicians to account for their responses to the crisis, 
and this leads to declining levels of trust in the institutions.”
56
 At the same time, “while citizens 
increasingly see the EU as part of the problem when it comes to the management of the economic crisis, 
they also consider it to be part of the solution: inside the Eurozone the EU is still considered to have 
greater capacity than national governments to solve the economic problems of the day.”
57
 Allowing for 
the EU to fulfill this role and become the forum through which citizens can engage with policy choices, 
requires, however, two fundamental institutional changes.   
 
The first change concerns the shift from consensual decision-making to political contestation within the 
different institutions. The idea here is that such contestation will foster holistic thinking,
58
 facilitate the 
distillation of the appropriate policies, serve to filter out inaccurate, biased or unreasonable 
arguments,
59
 legitimize policy enforcement, and offer much better tools for citizens to both control 
whether policies match their preferences and hold individual politicians to account.
60
 In simple terms, 
democratic contestation operates as a safety valve through which politicians are made sensitive to the 
demands of the citizenry. At the same time it encourages citizens to think through their personal 
preferences as well as their preferences in respect of the common good.
61
 The second fundamental 
change concerns a shift in power from the executive towards representative institutions; or, more 
generally, from executive power to constituted power. This is particularly pressing in the current 
structures of economic governance, which are decided almost exclusively by the executive branch, 
without input or control by representative institutions.  
 
All this entails significant changes within the different institutions, and in the relationship between 
them. It is proposed that such changes take place in two steps. First, the salient policy choices that are 
currently made within the context of the EDP, MEIP, European Semester, and in the negotiation of 
conditionality agreements need to be immediately ‘communitarised’. The wall of executive control that 
currently surrounds such decisions, and that allows the Member States’ executive branch to control 
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both the setting of general policy direction (through the European Council), and its detailed 
implementation and enforcement (through ECOFIN), must be torn down.
62
 Instead, questions pertaining 
to economic policy adjustment in Member States, the assessment of measures to be taken to counteract 
divergent macro-economic trends in different Member States, the exact terms and conditions for 
conditionality agreements, or the potential use of the ‘big bazooka’ of outright monetary transactions 
should be decided upon using the traditional set-up, whereby the Commission proposes, and the EP and 
Council co-decide. This presupposes a radical break from the current set-up of the ECB, and suggests 
that supposedly technocratic decisions that make significant winners and losers require the backing of 
political authority.  
 
All of the measures listed above are subject to significant contestation. Whereas some scholars argue in 
favour of more centralised EU enforcement, others argue that such ‘one size fits all’ policy-making 
underestimates the depth and even benefits of structural economic divergences between Member 
States. The purpose of ‘communitarisation’ would not be to resolve this debate one way or another but 
rather to make its resolution open to political contestation. The scope and ends of EU economic 
governance require political scrutiny in order to ensure that the process remains sensitive to the diverse 
interests that the stability of the integration process relies upon.  
 
In the longer run, a commitment to self-determination requires a more radical re-alignment of the EU 
institutions. Let us briefly outline the direction in which the EU needs to be transformed if it is to 
promote, rather than restrict, the citizens’ capacity for self-determination. First of all, this requires a 
decrease in the diversity of actors that are engaged in the law-making process. The participation of an 
independent Commission, national parliaments, national governments and the EP is traditionally seen as 
ensuring multiple sites of access for the individual to engage with the EU and its decision-making 
process. In an EU based on social and political conflict, however, such institutional diversity and disparity 
of access points inhibits the processes of centralized contestation that legitimizes salient political 
choices. In other words, we need to create an institution that has the monopoly on voice (that is, on 
political contestation).
63
 The EP appears to be the most natural forum for this role of collecting, 
channeling and mediate between the different conceptions of the ‘good’ that citizens in the EU might 
have, while allowing for the creation of transnational alliances that piece together the different 
cleavages that emerge in the national and transnational public space.
64
 The EP elections, however, need 
to be altered to allow for this – they must be based on European lists of transnational political parties 
(so as to force clear electoral competition, and discussion (of policies) across borders), forego the quota 
of MEPs per Member State, and be based on a system of proportionate representation across the EU. 
This would mean that EP candidates are not elected on the basis of their capacity to protect the 
interests of citizens of Hackney, or London, or South-East England, or England, or Northern Europe – and 
must instead present themselves as a candidate with a transnational agenda. This will allow the EP to be 
a forum for the citizen qua European. The EP would obtain strong structural mechanisms of ex-ante and 
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ex-post political control and accountability that we associate with strong parliaments on the national 
level, which should make it clearer to voters which individuals and parties are responsible for which 
policy decisions. Such a reconfiguration of the EP and the electoral process would ensure that the 
representative institutions, with their potential to channel social and political conflict and their capacity 
to mediate towards the ‘common good’, guide the EU’s political trajectory; and that citizens have clear 
structures of participation and control over the structures that shape their life.  
 
The leader of the party winning the election (or the leader of a coalition that holds a majority in the EP) 
will be asked to lead the EU’s central executive, the Commission, which has the tasks that are associated 
with the government on the national level. A College of Commissioners will be chosen on the basis of 
the electoral result.65 The Commission in this sense could no longer carry the pretense of acting as a 
purely ‘neutral’ regulatory actor (a function in any case increasingly over-taken by the EU’s use of 
agency structures). The Commission would be fully politically accountable for its decisions (reflecting the 
significant distributive consequences its existing decisions in the economic field carry). 
 
The Council, it is suggested, could be transformed into an upper legislative house, a sort of European 
Senate.
66
 Each Member State would send two representative of their national parliament and two 
representatives from the government as permanent members of the European Senate.67 Their task is 
similar to the EP’s – in so far as they participate in the legislative process (based on simple majority 
voting) and serve to control the Commission. They would be supported in this task by COREPER and 
COSAC, and have to meet the criteria of transparency and accountability that are associated with 
representative institutions, and are currently lacking in respect of the Council. The European Senate 
would represent the citizen not qua European (as the EP does), but qua national citizen. It would allow 
for a structural link between national parliaments and the EU’s legislative process, strengthen the 
communication between national parliaments and national governments, force Member States to 
negotiate openly and substantively on policy proposals rather than hide behind national interests, and 
allow for much better control of citizens over the way in which their Member State representatives 
vote.  
 
The proposed shifts in power – away from executive control and its practice of consensual decision-
making, and towards political contestation within the European Parliament – would go a long way 
towards allowing citizens to control the integration process and enhance the project of self-
determination. Principally, it would create an institutional monopoly on political contestation within the 
European Parliament, which would channel and further strengthen the emergence of the social and 
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political conflicts that lie at the centre of any project of political self-determination. It offers the 
possibility to prevent ‘national’ cleavages from determining the Union’s trajectory, offering a real 
possibility for Europe’s citizens to affect the social, economic, and moral fabric of the society in which 
they live.     
 
4. SPATIAL BALANCE AND THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL EQUALITY 
 
The idea of spatial balance, in short, relates to the question of political equality. Self-determination of a 
collectivity is based on the very basic premise that all citizens are moral equals, and as such have an 
equal say in the rules that bind them.
68
 Political equality, in this sense, legitimizes the norms a polity 
generates, their coercive effect and situates the polity as the appropriate site for the settling of 
conflicts.
69
 In the European context, this has always posed a challenge, and now more than ever. Should 
we think of political equality as operating primarily on the national or on the transnational level?
70
 
Should all 500.000.000 European citizens be represented equally, or should all 28 Member States be 
represented equally, given that each of these Member States is internally committed to the idea of 
political equality and self-determination? Is a Maltese veto and the Maltese overrepresentation in all 
institutions, with a population that represents 0,1% of the European citizenry, a protection of or affront 
to the values of political equality and self-determination? Until this point in the integration process, a 
commitment to these values has entailed ensuring national vetos, over-representing smaller Member 
States, and protecting policy outliers so as to protect their internal domestic space for self-
determination in salient policy areas.
71
 National actors have long had a monopoly on questions related 
to the ‘common good’, and any conflict was played out and mediated between national actors.
72
 
 
Upholding this logic now seems both a fiction (Member States are no longer equal since the crisis, and 
may not have ever been)73 and, more importantly, would stand in the way of re-configuring the Union as 
a space that furthers the project of self-determination. If we want citizens to contest and direct the 
course of integration, we must acknowledge that the objects of integration are citizens, and not (only) 
Member States. As discussed above, any reconfiguration of political rights that prioritises Member 
States as the relevant unit may well guarantee certain levels of democracy, but it cannot guarantee self-
determination. Scharpf’s recent proposals to rethink the Union’s institutional set-up are a good 
example. Scharpf suggests that the Council is to vote on all matters by majority rule, and that all 
Member States can decide to opt-out of specific legislative proposals unless a qualified majority of 
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Member States opposes the opt-out.
74
 Scharpf’s proposal has the merit of cutting through some veto-
players, and of potentially limiting the pervasive effect of negative integration. It does remain, at the 
same time, sensitive to the need to generate consensus between the different demoï (on which, in 
Scharpf’s view, the Union’s legitimacy is dependent). As such, it does little to offer the Union’s citizens 
any meaningful method for self-determination: it strongly reiterates the ‘national’ cleavage that stands 
in its way, and does not conceptually account for the capacity of citizens to actually affect the choices 
that influence their lives. To reiterate the point made above: strong protection of democracy ‘at home’ 
(and the articulation of democratic preferences as being tied to different national interests) structurally 
prevents any meaningful sense of functional self-determination in the EU.   
 
One should also mention in this regard the possibility of Scharpf’s proposals overlooking inequalities of 
power between Member States. As argued in our previous article
75
, Member States may not in practice 
be equally free to ‘opt-out’ of EU arrangements (particularly where dependent on financial assistance). 
They also may carry a highly un-even ability to ensure the outcomes of national democratic processes 
are truly reflected in EU policy. Finally, the current understanding of spatial equality presumes that the 
needs and desires of German citizens are uniform, and does not allow for the more sophisticated view 
that the crisis (and its responses) also divide citizens between those that ‘lose’ and those that ‘win’ 
domestically, or those that want ‘more’ or ‘less’ of a particular policy (whether that be austerity or 
another political course). This does not mean that the principle of equality between Member States has 
to be renounced per se, but it means that its expression has to be counterweighed by a conception of 
equality across the Member States.  
 
In line with our suggestions above, the idea of political equality of all Member States would find 
expression in the creation of a European Senate in which all Member States have an equal number (and 
weight) of votes.76 Such a distinction between full political equality of citizens (in the EP) and full political 
equality of Member States (in the ES) is, to use Somek’s words, “a mode of managing dual membership 
that reconciles negative political self-determination with its positive counterpart. It allows people to 
confront and transcend their local identity”.
77
 This structural partition of citizens into, on the one hand, 
EU citizens and, on the other hand, national citizens has also been suggested by Habermas as a 
mechanism to bridge the individual’s self-understanding with the different normative projects that she 
engages in.
78
 To put it simply, it ensures that citizens do not have to choose between being ‘a national’ 
and being ‘European’, and, more importantly, it allows citizens to articulate different needs, desires and 
priorities given the relative institutional capacities of the different levels of government. This 
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disaggregation of the citizen also acknowledges the fact that individuals in Europe at once populate an 
ill-defined and incipient transnational common space where they engage as equals and simultaneously 
populate smaller, more homogeneous territories where they “have distinct interests, make divergent 
rights claims and so differ over many public policies”.79 
 
Finally, this renewed concept of political equality – based on the full equality of citizens in the EU – also 
suggests that the equality between Member States must be re-articulated within the EU’s institutional 
set-up, rather than outside of it. Many authors have suggested that the only way in which we can 
democratize the Union is by strengthening the role of national parliaments in controlling the executive 
branches of the Member State and the Union,
80
 in remedying its democratic deficit,
81
 or in engaging the 
Union’s legislative process.82 We would contend that the commitment to self-determination and 
political equality counsel against such a process.  
 
Again, this argument is based on a distinction between a commitment to democracy (which would argue 
in favour of an enhanced role for national parliaments) and a commitment to self-determination (which 
would argue against the role of national parliaments unless their role is within, rather than outside, the 
institutional system). Granting enhanced powers to national parliaments faces at least four problems. 
First, it creates significant democratic externalities. Allowing a national parliament (or court, for that 
matter) to decide on matters that affect citizens across the EU violates the very first principle of the 
liberal-democratic order, which equates subjects and objects of rule.
83
 Casting the right of the German 
parliament to decide on the level of Portuguese pensions as protecting democracy in Germany is 
nothing if not parochial, myopic and a complete rejection of any semblance of self-determination.
84
 The 
very structure of national politics, as explained by Bartolini, militates against the production of common 
goods that transcend the nation state.
85
 Second, divesting such powers in national parliaments creates 
unproductive social and political conflicts. As elaborated above, conflicts can serve to clarify priorities 
and mediate disagreement only if they are bounded within a certain institutional setting that allows for 
mutual understanding of actors through communication. National parliaments are not embedded in 
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such a structure. Third, placing the burden of democratizing the Union on national parliaments is a 
recipe for negative politics that have little to do with self-determination. National parliaments can block 
certain initiatives put forward by the Union’s institutions (whether through their role in the early 
warning system, the Barroso initiative, or by controlling their executive), but cannot engage in 
discussion on amendments or collectively re-articulate what they think might be more appropriate 
policies.
86
 At the same time, directing citizens towards national parliaments in their concerns over the 
functioning of the Union is also problematic because it prevents them from engaging in the 
transnational forum where such concerns can be internalized in the decision-making process. In other 
words, enhancing the powers of national parliaments strengthens ‘national’ cleavages rather than 
‘functional’ cleavages. Fourth, insisting on the role of national actors or national safeguards in protecting 
democracy within the EU is not a commitment to political equality but a front to perpetuate the status 
quo. One only has to think of the difference between a Greek referendum on the conditions of the bail-
out (which was dropped under pressure by Merkozy and cast as challenging democracy) and the 
dictates of the German constitutional court (which are heralded as protecting democracy).
87
  
 
This is not to say that national actors cannot serve the project of self-determination and bolster the 
concept of political equality. It is simply to say that their role must be articulated within the EU’s 
institutional settlement – via, for example, our suggestion of seating two national parliamentarians in a 
European Senate – rather than outside of it. In such a scenario, national parliaments would be able to 
structure their contributions (and opposition) to EU policy in a productive manner. Seeing national 
parliamentary democracy as a contributor to EU political self-determination requires, in simple terms, 
meaningfully including it within the EU’s democratic machinery.  
 
The spatial balance and the question of political equality within the EU has always been a difficult 
question. Our suggestion here is that, when looked at from the perspective of self-determination (rather 
than that of democracy), it might be useful to understand the idea of spatial balance no longer as a way 
to balance between the relative strength of Germany and Malta, but rather as a disaggregation between 
the European citizenry as a whole and the European citizenry as national electorates. This seems to be 
the most promising way of reconfiguring the Union’s project as increasing, rather than hindering, the 
project of self-determination, fostering the political cleavages and structures of contestation that are 
indispensable for that project to succeed.  
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5. THE LAW OF CONFLICT
88
 
A new-look EU, as advocated in this article, requires not only new normative paradigms, a new 
institutional structure and a different understanding of political equality, but it also requires a new 
understanding of the function of law. Traditionally, law has been understood as both ‘object’ and ‘agent’ 
of EU integration.
89
 As ‘agent’ law has been the vehicle through which the political goals of integration 
have been pursued, cutting through the resistance of national laws and policies in the process – never 
more than since the start of the crisis.
90
 As ‘object’, law has been no mere instrument but part of the 
ends of integration itself: one of the heralded achievements of the EU has been the development of an 
autonomous EU legal order. Law has been used to limit the ability of national or transnational 
constituencies to contest political preferences laid down in the Treaties. A European law of conflict 
would involve challenging law’s de-politicising role. In this sense, EU law would no longer insulate and 
suppress conflict, but instead serve as a vehicle for the promotion and channeling of social conflict over 
EU integration’s substantive ends. In this sense, much like, for example, Habermas’ procedural 
conception of legality
91
 - law does not serve to answer the question of what the ‘good life’ presupposes; 
but instead acts as a vehicle within which deliberation about those goals can take place. Law in this 
sense acts as a container for political and social conflict, allowing free deliberation while also guarding 
against the exclusion from the political process of weak or marginalized interests. Several elements of 
national public law could be seen as carrying forward this function. The establishment, for example, of 
political rights to freedom of expression and association, as well as the use of administrative law to 
demand basic standards of accountability and transparency in the political process can be seen as 
examples of law’s use, not to settle, but to channel and protect, open political conflict. 
 
Applying this procedural understanding of law to the Union would have two implications. The first is that 
policy objectives are to be deleted from the Treaty, as discussed above (or at least interpreted by the 
Court in a much more open fashion than evident in existing jurisprudence). The new European 
constitution should not be partisan (entrenching a certain policy direction) but should be pluralist 
(allowing and channeling contestation about policy direction).
92
 Scharpf, among others, has also 
suggested this approach under the banner of the ‘deconstitutionalisation’ of EU law.
93
 Our proposal, 
however, would go further. It would involve opening up not only the EU’s policy orientation but also the 
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scope and nature of its competences to contestation. This would, for example, require a rethinking of 
the principle of subsidiarity. That principle’s function in the current Treaties is based, to use Davies’ 
words, on a ‘cheat’.
94
 By operating primarily as a test of comparative efficiency, it tests the ability of 
different institutions to implement certain goals, without questioning the merits of these goals in the 
first place.
95
 Powers are allocated according to which level of governance can act effectively; not 
according to political views on the part of citizens about the fields in which the EU should or should not 
act. This formulation of the principle of subsidiarity has led to a number of intractable problems
96
 with 
the result that the allocation of ‘shared competence’ has often become an area of more or less 
unfettered executive discretion.
97
  
 
A procedural approach of law in the EU would understand subsidiarity as a political rather than legal 
question. The balance between EU and national powers – of who is ‘best’ to regulate, and the degree 
and prescriptiveness of EU level intervention – would no longer be a legal or technocratic question but a 
legitimate political cleavage upon which different political groupings could take a position and for which 
the European institutions would be politically accountable. Institutions such as the Commission, under 
this model, would be reluctant to enact ‘unnecessary’ EU-level regulation not because of fear of judicial 
review but because of their need to politically defend and justify proposals in an arena where the 
decision to regulate at the EU level could be politically challenged. Law’s role under this model would 
not be to adjudicate on the ‘correct’ application of the principle – according to objective ‘efficiency’ 
criteria - but rather to ensure the integrity of the political process through which the question of 
whether regulation is needed at EU level is resolved. Law’s role is not to prescribe but to politicize.  
 
This speaks to a second implication of understanding EU law as being about the generation and 
channeling of political and social conflict. If a commitment to self-determination implies that European 
law is structurally open as to the substantive goals that it pursues, that does not mean that every 
element of the legal order is up for grabs.
98
 A law of conflict requires a hierarchy of norms, containing at 
least two levels. Constitutional (or Treaty-based) norms would protect the ‘rules of the game’ that are 
necessary to guarantee the political process between free and equal citizens. This would include at the 
very least fundamental rights and certain social-economic constitutional guarantees such as currently 
laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights, the 
provision of certain public goods, rules necessary to foster the formation of political cleavages and to 
protect free political exchange,
99
 rules governing the territorial boundaries of the EU, and rules 
guaranteeing the cultural diversity of the Union. The inclusion of the latter, it is remembered, stems 
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from the need, discussed above, to prevent the politicization of the EU from engendering cultural 
(rather than socio-economic) conflicts and leading to political rupture, rather than political 
integration.
100
 For all other legislative proposals, or revisions of existing legislation, the European Senate, 
like the European Parliament, would vote by simple majority. The legal framework of the EU, in other 
words, should complement the normative and institutional changes proposed above. It should open up 
for contestation the question of the appropriate depth, nature and direction of European integration, 
while protecting the political equality of the European citizens and their capacity to engage in European 
politics as an exercise in political self-determination.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has suggested that the current trajectory of the EU risks entrenching, rather than 
questioning, the current preference for austerity and its authoritative enforcement. This poses 
significant problems for the long-term stability and legitimacy of the Union, which relies on furthering, 
rather than limiting, the individual citizens’ capacity for self-determination. Our proposal – to move from 
an idea of constitutional balance to an idea of constitutional conflict, with an institutional and legal 
framework to match – may seem unrealistic, and indeed it might be. It can be understood as a roadmap 
for change, as suggesting an evolutionary process rather than requiring a ‘big bang’ reform. Member 
State executives, after all, given their strong hold on the process of integration, are very unlikely to 
favour an approach that curtails their control over the electoral agenda and the direction of European 
integration. As we have argued, however, without the massive re-enfranchisement of citizens, the 
integration process is doomed to fail either way. As Scharpf has recently reminded us, unfeasible 
options become feasible possibilities once the institutional status quo can no longer make sense of 
society.
101
 The social, political and economic limits of the current status quo of integration are all too 
apparent, as is the growing domestic resistance and institutional resentment it engenders. The EU 
creates despondency: it lacks the virtues of hope and joy that inspire passion, engagement and 
contestation. Only a drastic reorientation of the integration project as an instrument for self-
determination has the potential to reverse this process.  
This is the core of our normative aspiration. It is not to create a federal European superstate, but to 
create an institutional framework that is geared to answer that one political question that rules them all: 
how do we want to live together in this particular place on earth? The answer to this may lead to the 
unravelling of the integration process, or to ‘ever further integration’. It would allow citizens to contest a 
particular normative manifestation of the EU, without simultaneously contesting the integration project 
as such. It might even lead to more austerity. At least, however, these choices will be made because 
Europe’s citizens want them, with dissatisfaction harnessed as a strength of the process of integration, 
rather than a weakness. A constitutional order based on conflict may be the only available route to a 
constitutional order in which the destiny of the EU is in the hands of Europeans themselves. European 
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citizens can affect the social, economic, and moral texture of the society in which they live – but only if 
they do so together.  
